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Biased attention towards emotional stimuli is adaptive, as it facilitates responses to
important threats and rewards. An unfortunate consequence is that emotional stimuli
can become potent distractors when they are irrelevant to current goals. How can
this distraction be overcome despite the bias to attend to emotional stimuli? Recent
studies show that distraction by irrelevant flankers is reduced when distractor frequency
is high, even if they are emotional. A parsimonious explanation is that the expectation
of frequent distractors promotes the use of proactive control, whereby attentional
control settings can be altered to minimize distraction before it occurs. It is difficult,
however, to infer proactive control on the basis of behavioral data alone. We therefore
measured neural indices of proactive control while participants performed a target-
detection task in which irrelevant peripheral distractors (either emotional or neutral) could
appear either frequently (on 75% of trials) or rarely (on 25% of trials). We measured
alpha power during the pre-stimulus period to assess proactive control and during
the post-stimulus period to determine the consequences of control for subsequent
processing. Pre-stimulus alpha power was tonically suppressed in the high, compared to
low, distractor frequency condition, regardless of expected distractor valence, indicating
sustained use of proactive control. In contrast, post-stimulus alpha suppression was
reduced in the high-frequency condition, suggesting that proactive control reduced the
need for post-stimulus adjustments. Our findings indicate that a sustained proactive
control strategy accounts for the reduction in both emotional and non-emotional
distraction when distractors are expected to appear frequently.
Keywords: alpha suppression, attention, emotion, cognitive control, EEG
INTRODUCTION
An attentional bias towards emotional stimuli can be advantageous, because they often signal the
presence of threats and rewards (Yiend, 2010; Okon-Singer et al., 2013; Pourtois et al., 2013) and
so can guide adaptive behavior (LeDoux, 1996). Sometimes, however, we need to ignore emotional
stimuli so we can achieve other goals (Lee and Chao, 2012). Effective use of emotional information
therefore requires that we strike a delicate balance, being open to interruption when emotional
stimuli are potentially important but ignoring them when they are not. Here, we explore the
mechanisms of cognitive control that allow us to negotiate these competing demands.
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We draw on the Dual Mechanisms of Control framework
(DMC; Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012), which provides an
explanation of cognitive control in non-emotional contexts.
Within the model, cognitive control operates within either a
reactive or a proactive mode (Braver et al., 2009; Braver, 2012).
Reactive control involves recruitment of regulatory processes to
correct deviations from goal-directed cognition when conflict
is detected. In contrast, proactive control is a more effective
but resource-intensive strategy whereby conflict is anticipated
and prevented before it can occur. According to the model, the
extent to which either strategy is used shifts dynamically, based
on motivational and task demands, according to a cognitive
cost–benefit analysis (Braver, 2012). Because proactive control
requires the active (and costly) maintenance of the current
goal, we use reactive control as the default strategy and only
shift to proactive control when the benefits outweigh the costs,
for example, when conflict is expected or when incentives
are available to motivate good performance (Braver et al.,
2007; Locke and Braver, 2008; Aron, 2011). Although many
applications of the DMC framework address response-level
conflicts (e.g., in Stroop or cued response tasks), it can also
be applied to the control of perceptual conflicts, for example,
between goal-relevant targets and goal-irrelevant distractors
(i.e., perceptual distraction; Geng, 2014).
Although the DMC framework accounts for cognitive control
in non-emotional contexts, it has rarely been applied to the
control of emotional distractors, which might be expected to
place extra demands on control mechanisms. Recent work in our
lab (Grimshaw et al., 2018; Walsh et al., 2018, 2019) shows that
emotional distraction can be well-controlled under conditions
that encourage the use of proactive control. One way to promote
the use of proactive control is to increase the proportion of
trials on which conflicts arise, so that they are expected to occur
frequently (Corballis and Gratton, 2003; Neo and Chua, 2006;
Geyer et al., 2008; Bugg and Crump, 2012). Using an irrelevant
peripheral distractor paradigm (modeled on that described by
Forster and Lavie, 2008), we showed that increased distractor
frequency yields less distraction, even when distractors are
emotional (Grimshaw et al., 2018). Participants completed a
simple (i.e., low load) letter discrimination task near fixation,
while a peripheral distractor image was presented on either 25%
or 75% of trials. In separate blocks, distractors could be either
high arousal negative images (mutilations), high arousal positive
images (erotic couples), or neutral images of people engaged
in everyday activities. When distractors appeared on 25% of
trials, emotional images slowed response times significantlymore
than neutral images; however, when distractors appeared on 75%
of trials, neither emotional nor neutral images produced any
distraction at all (see also Micucci et al., 2020).
A parsimonious explanation of these findings is that high
distractor frequency encouraged a shift to proactive control,
which effectively reduced emotional distraction. Although
behavioral findings are consistent with this explanation, it is
also possible that increased distractor frequency facilitated or
speeded reactive control processes like distractor suppression,
disengagement, or reorienting to the target (Geng et al., 2019).
More direct markers of the time course and nature of control can
be provided by neuroimaging and psychophysiological evidence
(e.g., Chatham et al., 2009; Burgess and Braver, 2010; Jimura
et al., 2010; Chiew and Braver, 2013; Botvinick and Braver,
2015; Chevalier et al., 2015; Walsh et al., 2019). For example,
behavioral markers of reactive control have been associated with
post-conflict increases in pupil dilation (an index of cognitive
effort; Chatham et al., 2009; Walsh et al., 2019), and with
transient post-stimulus activation of the lateral prefrontal cortex
(PFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)—areas thought to
subserve conflict monitoring and resolution processes (Braver
et al., 2003). In contrast, behavioral markers of proactive control
(e.g., reduced interference following predictive or incentive
cues) have been associated with an increase in tonic pupil
dilation—indicating sustained use of proactive control across
trials—and with phasic dilation in the pre-stimulus period,
indicating the dynamic use of proactive control (Chiew and
Braver, 2013;Walsh et al., 2019). Neuroimaging studies also show
sustained activity in lateral PFC under conditions that encourage
proactive control (Burgess and Braver, 2010; Jimura et al., 2010;
Marini et al., 2016), reflecting the ongoing active maintenance of
task goals.
Posterior-occipital alpha (8–13 Hz) is an alternative online
index of cognitive control that has greater temporal sensitivity
than either fMRI or pupillometry and therefore may be even
better suited for tracking dynamic changes in control in real
time. Posterior alpha is established as an inverse measure of
cortical excitability (Laufs et al., 2006; Haegens et al., 2011)
and attentional engagement (Macdonald et al., 2011; Boudewyn
and Carter, 2017; Itthipuripat et al., 2017). Importantly, alpha
reflects not just spontaneous fluctuations in attention, but also
top-down adjustments of cognitive control (Thut et al., 2006;
Capotosto et al., 2009; Carp and Compton, 2009). For example,
alpha is suppressed in the pre-stimulus interval following task
switching cues, indicating that it is involved in proactive rule
updating (Cooper et al., 2016). Alpha suppression is also typically
observed post-stimulus and is pronounced following errors or
high-conflict stimuli (Compton et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2015,
2018a,b; Itthipuripat et al., 2017), suggesting that it reflects
post-stimulus task engagement as well.
Furthermore, the scalp distribution of alpha modulation is
linked to the direction of spatial attention (Frey et al., 2015; Foster
and Awh, 2019). In cued attention tasks, alpha shows greater
suppression contralateral to the cued visual field (e.g., Sauseng
et al., 2005; Kelly et al., 2006; Thut et al., 2006; van Diepen et al.,
2016; but see Limbach and Corballis, 2017 for qualification), and
this effect is further enhanced by increasing the proportion of
valid cues (Gould et al., 2011; van Ede et al., 2012; Dombrowe
and Hilgetag, 2014). This lateralization of pre-stimulus alpha
has been suggested to reflect top-down anticipatory biasing of
cortical excitability in order to enhance potential target locations
while inhibiting potential distractor locations (Foxe and Snyder,
2011). The retinotopic modulation of pre-stimulus alpha power
is therefore one neural mechanism by which proactive control
might be implemented.
Following our previous behavioral work (Grimshaw et al.,
2018), we hypothesize that proactive control will be engaged
when people anticipate more frequent distractors. We therefore
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measured EEG while participants completed an irrelevant-
distractor task in which they identified a target presented
on the vertical midline while ignoring emotional and neutral
images presented laterally. Participants were randomly assigned
to see distractors on either 25% or 75% of trials. We were
interested in two types of proactive control: the sustained
maintenance of control across trials, as well as a dynamic
enhancement of attentional engagement following a warning
signal (a fixation cross) for an upcoming trial. We therefore
measured the tonic level of unbaselined alpha observed
across a block of trials (as a measure of sustained proactive
control), the phasic drop in alpha during preparation for an
upcoming trial (measured relative to a pre-fixation baseline;
a measure of dynamic proactive control), and an index of
alpha lateralization (a measure of location specific control).
Additionally, we measured alpha in the post-stimulus period to
examine the downstream consequences of proactive control on
subsequent processing.
Using these measures, we address four questions: first, does
high distractor frequency in the irrelevant-distractor paradigm
promote the use of proactive control? If so, then pre-stimulus
posterior alpha should be suppressed in the high relative to
low distractor frequency condition (either phasically, tonically,
or both) reflecting greater task-engagement when preparing for
distractors that are expected to appear frequently.
Second, is such control tailored to the expected valence of
a distractor? Given that emotional distractors are particularly
potent, do participants up-regulate control when emotional
distractors are expected? To answer this question, we blocked
trials by distractor valence, so that participants could anticipate
the type of distractor they might encounter. If people use greater
cognitive effort to ignore anticipated emotional (compared to
neutral) distractors, then greater pre-stimulus alpha suppression
would be expected in emotional relative to non-emotional blocks.
We included both positive and negative emotional distractors in
order to determine whether the use of control differs according
to valence.
Third, is proactive control achieved through the mechanism
of location-based distractor inhibition? A modification to the
original paradigm used in Grimshaw et al. (2018) allows
us to examine pre-stimulus alpha lateralization, which has
been proposed to reflect inhibition within the ipsilateral
field (Foxe and Snyder, 2011; Vissers et al., 2016; Wildegger
et al., 2017). We blocked distractor visual field (left/right)
so that participants could anticipate the visual field of an
upcoming distractor, although not its specific location within
that field. If proactive control is implemented through location-
based distractor inhibition (Gaspelin and Luck, 2018), then
pre-stimulus alpha should be potentiated contralateral to the
expected distractor visual field in the high compared to the low
distractor frequency condition.
Finally, we ask how high distractor frequency affects the
subsequent neural response to distractors themselves. Greater
use of proactive control (prior to stimulus onset) predicts
less need for reactive control (following stimulus onset). We
addressed this question by examining the effect of distractor
frequency and valence on post-stimulus alpha suppression.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The effect of distractor frequency on behavioral distraction
(measured in RT) in Grimshaw et al. (2018) was d = 0.78
(averaged across two experiments), which indicates
27 participants per condition to detect a similar effect
with 80% power. For counterbalancing purposes, we ran
60 participants (27 men; 33 women) ranging from 18 to
27 years of age (M = 21.78 years, SD = 2.87), recruited from an
undergraduate psychology pool. One participant was excluded
due to discomfort, which prevented them from completing
the experiment. All participants were fluent English speakers
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported that
they were not receiving current treatment for depression or
anxiety. Participants were randomly assigned to low or high
distractor frequency conditions. They received course credit or
movie vouchers in exchange for their participation and provided
written informed consent prior to participation. The study was
approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the School of
Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand).
Materials
Task Procedure
The irrelevant-distractor task was very similar to that described
in Grimshaw et al. (2018), with some modifications that allowed
us to examine lateralized alpha power (see Figure 1). Participants
discriminated whether a briefly (100 ms) presented capitalized
target letter was a ‘‘K’’ or an ‘‘N.’’ The target letter (font: Arial;
font size: 24; color: white; subtending 0.67  of visual angle) was
randomly presented in one of six possible locations arranged in
a central column along the vertical midline. Letters were evenly
spaced (0.67  visual degrees apart), and the top and bottom
letters appeared 1.68  of visual angle directly above and below
fixation. Lowercase ‘‘o’’s (font: Arial; font size: 8; subtending
0.22  of visual angle) appeared in the five non-target positions
on each trial. Each trial began with a central fixation cross
of a random duration between 900 and 1,100 ms. Following
fixation, the visual letter display was presented for 100 ms.
Participants indicated whether the target was an ‘‘N’’ or a ‘‘K’’
by pressing ‘‘1’’ or ‘‘2’’ with the index and middle finger of their
dominant hand. Key response mappings were counterbalanced
across participants. On a specified proportion of trials (25% in
the low and 75% in the high distractor frequency conditions), a
lateralized distractor image was presented simultaneously with
the visual letter display, randomly in either an upper or lower
quadrant, with the center of the image appearing 7.59  visual
angle from fixation.
Participants received auditory feedback (a 100-ms ‘‘beep’’)
following either an incorrect response or a response slower than
the 1,700-ms response window. A jittered inter-trial interval
was used, ranging between 590 and 790 ms after each response
until the onset of the next fixation cross. Trials were blocked by
distractor valence (positive, negative, and neutral). Specifically,
participants completed three superblocks (192 trials each), in
which the distractor was always the same valence, with order
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FIGURE 1 | Trial procedure and stimulus display. Distractors could appear lateral to the target display either in the upper or lower quadrant, blocked by hemi-field.
Image for illustrative purposes only; the images were drawn from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008). Displays not to scale. Source:
available from https://www.123rf.com/photo_29940472stock-photo.html, © 123rf.com.
counterbalanced across participants. Each valence superblock
comprised four sub-blocks of 48 trials each; across sub-blocks,
the distractor visual field alternated (left/right or right/left;
counterbalanced across participants) every 24 trials. The order of
sub-blocks was consistent across each valence-block (i.e., it was
always either left/right or right/left throughout the task). Thus,
the side of the potential distractor (although not the quadrant)
was predictable on each trial. Participants were not told the
frequency with which distractors would be presented or that the
valence of distractors would alter between blocks; however, they
completed two initial practice blocks of 48 trials (four sub-blocks
of 12 trials each), with distractor stimuli consisting of pixel
scrambles of the intact images used during the task, presented
at the same frequency as the assigned condition. This allowed
participants to develop an expectancy about distractor frequency
and the consistency of the distractor visual field before exposure
to intact images.
Picture Stimuli
The same distractor stimuli were used as in Grimshaw et al.
(2018; see SupplementaryMaterial 1.1 for specific images). Two
gender-tailored sets of 36 color images were taken from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008),
selected to have similar mean valence and arousal ratings for each
gender. Stimuli were 12 neutral pictures (scenes depicting people
in daily life activities), 12 negative pictures (body mutilations),
and 12 positive pictures (erotic images involving heterosexual
couples). Pictures were matched for luminance and contrast with
MATLAB SHINE toolbox (Willenbockel et al., 2010). Pictures
subtended 6.68  ⇥ 6.68  of visual angle and were presented
in color.
Procedure
Each session took approximately 100 min, including EEG setup.
After setup, participants completed the experiment in a dimly
lit, electrically shielded room with the task presented on a Dell
Precision T1600 computer, with a 2300 Alienware 2310 LCD
monitor running at a vertical refresh rate of 120 Hz. A viewing
distance of 57 cm was maintained using a chinrest. Stimulus
presentation and response collection were controlled using
E-prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools Inc, 2012). In
accordance with our standard lab procedure, before participants
received task instructions, they were instructed to rest (with
eyes open and with minimum movement) for 2 min, while
we recorded their resting EEG activity. Alpha activity during
this pre-task resting period did not differ between groups,
t(57) = 0.086, p = 0.932 (see Supplementary Material 1.2).
EEG Recording
EEG was recorded with a Lycra Quick-Cap (Compumedics
NeuroMedical Supplies) embedded with Ag/AgCl electrodes at
28 scalp sites (FP1, FP2, F7, F3, FZ, F4, F8, FT7, FC3, FC4,
FT8, T7, C3, CZ, C4, T8, TP7, CP3, CP4, TP8, P7, P3, PZ,
P4, P8, O1, Oz, and O2, according to the modified 10-20
system; American Electroencephalographic Society, 1994). To
detect blinks and eye movements, the electrooculogram (EOG)
was recorded from electrodes placed at the outer canthus
of each eye (horizontal), and above and below the left eye
(vertical). Electrodes were also placed on the mastoid bones
behind the right and left ears. The EEG and EOG channels
were referenced online to the left mastoid and re-referenced
offline to the algebraic average of the left and right mastoids.
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Impedances were periodically checked between blocks and were
kept below 5 k2.
The EEG signal was amplified with Professional BrainAmps
and digitized at a sampling rate of 500 Hz with Brain-
Vision Recorder (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). Data
were filtered online with a high-pass filter of 0.02 Hz. Signals
were analyzed using Brain-vision Analyzer 2.0 (Brain Products,
Gilching, Germany). Horizontal EOG (HEOG) and Vertical
EOG (VEOG) channels were created by calculating the difference
between HEOG-Right and HEOG-Left, and VEOG-Lower and
VEOG-Upper, respectively. Data were filtered offline with a low
cutoff of 0.01 Hz and a high cutoff of 30 Hz, with a notch filter
at 50 Hz using a zero phaseshift Butterworth filter (12 dB/oct).
Raw data were manually inspected, and noisy segments were
excluded prior to ICA calculation. Ocular artifacts were removed
using the ICA ocular correction method in Brainvision Analyzer.
The topography of the rejected ICA ocular components was each
verified by visual inspection.
EEG Analysis
For the analysis of pre-stimulus measures, data were partitioned
into 2,700-ms epochs, beginning 600 ms before the onset of the
fixation cross (i.e., during the ITI) and finishing 2,100 ms after
fixation onset (i.e., 1,000–1,200 ms after target display onset).
For the analysis of post-stimulus measures, data were segmented
into 2,100-ms epochs, beginning 600 ms before stimulus onset
(i.e., during the pre-stimulus interval) and finishing 1,500 ms
after stimulus onset. These long epochs provide sufficient buffer
zones at the beginning and end of each segment to avoid
contaminating data in the time windows of interest due to ‘‘edge
artifacts’’ produced by the wavelet analysis (Cohen, 2014).
Because we were interested in assessing whether distractor
frequency affected alpha power across trials (i.e., tonic alpha),
we did not use a baseline correction procedure. Only correct
trials were used for analysis. To remove artifacts due to muscle
movements, segments with a change in voltage exceeding ±100
µV over posterior electrodes (01, 02, 0z, Pz, P3, P4, P7, and
P8) were excluded. This rejection criterion led to a mean total
rejection of 4.9% (SD = 4.7) of trials. We did not exclude
trials in which blinks occurred, as this would have resulted
in excessive data loss given the long windows. However, any
distortion in posterior alpha due to EOG activity is likely
to be negligible (Hagemann and Naumann, 2001) and not
systematically associated with condition.
Alpha Power Analysis
Single-trial power (µV2) was estimated separately for the
pre-stimulus and post-stimulus epochs, using a Continuous
Morlet wavelet transformation, and averaged separately for
each valenced superblock. The Morlet time–frequency analysis
consisted of 20 linearly spaced frequency bands, ranging from
1 to 20 Hz (Cohen, 2014). To account for individual differences
in peak alpha frequency, the specific band used for each
individual (e.g., Klimesch, 1999; Pfurtscheller and Da Silva,
1999; Bas̨ar, 2012) was chosen based on their individual alpha
frequency (IAF), identified in a Fast Fourier Transform across
all pre-stimulus epochs, with a frequency resolution of 0.49 Hz,
measured at electrodes 01, 0z, and 02 (see Gould et al., 2011
for a similar approach). The frequency band with the closest
central frequency to each participant’s IAF was selected for
statistical analysis. The mean IAF was 10.06 Hz (SE = 0.12),
similar to alpha bands used in other studies (e.g., Limbach and
Corballis, 2017). Each participant’s alpha power was pooled
across 01, 0z, and 02, averaged separately for each valence
condition and at each time point, and exported to R for
statistical analysis. Because we were interested in tonic alpha
suppression (i.e., across trials), we did not use a baseline
correction. To correct for non-normality, mean alpha power
values were log-transformed prior to being further analyzed.
Shapiro-Wilks tests confirmed that, after transformation, there
were no violations of normality in either the pre-stimulus or
post-stimulus epochs (all p’s > 0.10).
We also calculated a lateralized measure of alpha power for
each valence block, comparing sub-blocks in which participants
expected distractors to appear in the left and right visual fields.
On the pre-stimulus epochs, alpha lateralization indices (ALIs)
for the P7/P8 electrode pair were calculated using the formula
(Ipsilateral   Contralateral)/(Ipsilateral + Contralateral) (Thut
et al., 2006). Values of this ALI can vary from  1 to +1,
where a negative value indicates greater alpha power over the
side contralateral to the potential distractor location (indicating
suppression at potential distraction locations), and a value of zero
signifies the absence of lateralized differences.
Statistical Analyses
Behavioral Data
Accuracy and mean reaction time (RT) were calculated for each
condition. For RT measures, only correct responses with an
RT longer than 200 ms were analyzed, ensuring anticipatory
responses were not included in the analyses. This exclusion
criterion led to the average removal of 3.15% (SD = 4.50)
of trials per participant. Because our primary hypotheses
concerned distraction in terms of increased response latency,
a distraction index was calculated for each valenced block as
(RT distractor present   RT distractor absent). To assess the
effects of distractor frequency, distraction indices and accuracy
were analyzed in a 3 (valence: negative, neutral, positive) ⇥ 2
(distractor frequency: low, high) mixed ANOVA. In order to
determine whether distraction was affected by the type of
distractor that was expected, we assessed effects of valence (which
indicate differences across the three valence conditions) as well as
quadratic effects of valence (which indicate differences between
emotional and neutral conditions)1. Hypothesized interactions
between valence and distractor frequency were followed up with
one-way ANOVAs in each frequency condition if p < 0.10.
Pre-stimulus Alpha Power
We first used a mass univariate approach to identify the time
windows within the pre-stimulus period in which alpha power
was influenced by the expected frequency or valence of upcoming
distractors. Non-baselined alpha power was analyzed in a 2
1The neutral condition was entered as the middle level of the valence variable,
meaning that differences between emotional and neutral conditions (regardless of
valence) would be revealed as quadratic effects.
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(distractor frequency: low, high) ⇥ 3 (valence: negative, neutral,
positive) mixed ANOVA at each sampled time point between
 200 ms and 1,200 ms (relative to fixation onset). The false
discovery rate (FDR) control procedure was used in order to
correct for multiple comparisons (Benjamini and Hochberg,
1995; Lage-Castellanos et al., 2010; Groppe et al., 2011; Luck,
2014). Because this mass univariate analysis cannot explicitly
assess changes in alpha power across time, we conducted an
additional analysis in order to compare alpha power at the
beginning and end of the fixation period. Average alpha power
was extracted from two time windows: a 200-ms pre-fixation
window (i.e., during the ITI) and a 200-ms pre-stimulus window
between 700 and 900 ms following the onset of fixation
(i.e., immediately prior to the earliest possible onset of a
target display). The extracted alpha power was analyzed in a
2 (distractor frequency: low, high) ⇥ 2 (time window: pre-
fixation, pre-stimulus) ⇥ 3 (valence: negative, neutral, positive)
mixed ANOVA. We expected to see a drop in alpha power over
time (i.e., alpha suppression), consistent with preparation for
the upcoming trial. In this analysis, a main effect of distractor
frequency would reflect tonic alpha suppression (i.e., sustained
proactive control), while an interaction of distractor frequency
and time would reflect phasic alpha suppression (i.e., dynamic
proactive control). Interactions with valence in either analysis
would indicate tailoring of control to the expected valence of an
upcoming distractor. As with the behavioral data, we tested both
overall and quadratic effects of valence.
Alpha Lateralization
To determine whether alpha power was lateralized in
anticipation of distractor onset, each ALI (averaged across
the pre-stimulus time window) was tested against zero in a
Bonferroni-corrected one sample t-test. Effects of distractor
frequency and valence on alpha lateralization were then analyzed
with mass univariate 3 (valence: negative, neutral, positive) ⇥ 2
(distractor frequency: low, high) mixed ANOVAs. A main effect
of distractor frequency (that is, greater lateralization with high
than with low distractor frequency) would indicate proactive
inhibition of anticipated distractor location; interactions
between distractor frequency and valence would indicate
tailoring of inhibition to the expected valence of a distractor.
Post-stimulus Alpha Power
To determine whether distractor frequency alters the neural
response to distractors, we conducted mass univariate 2
(distractor frequency: low, high) ⇥ 2 (distractor present: present,
absent)⇥ 3 (valence: negative, neutral, positive) ANOVAs (FDR-
corrected) for each data point from stimulus onset until 1,700 ms
post-stimulus. As in our analysis of behavioral distraction, we
calculated an index of distractor-driven suppression (Distractor
Present Alpha   Distractor Absent Alpha) for further analysis
with mass univariate 3 (valence: negative, neutral, positive) ⇥ 2
(frequency: high, low) ANOVAs for each data point.
In all analyses, Greenhouse–Geisser corrections were applied
when Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated. Effect sizes are
⌘2p for ANOVA effects, ds for comparison of independent means,
and dz for comparison of paired mean (Lakens, 2013).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Mean overall accuracy rates, RTs, and distraction indices are
presented in Table 1. Mean RTs were first analyzed in a
2 (distractor frequency: high, low) ⇥ 2 (distractor presence:
present, absent) ⇥ 3 (valence: positive, neutral, negative)
ANOVA, which showed no main effect of distractor frequency,
F(1,57) = 0.056, p = 0.813, ⌘2p = <0.01, indicating that there
was no overall difference in RTs between conditions. We
therefore focused on distraction indices (RT present   RT
absent) in subsequent analyses, as these are most relevant to
hypotheses (see Supplementary Material 1.3 for analyses using
RT as the dependent variable). The two-way mixed ANOVA
of distractor frequency ⇥ valence (see Figure 2) showed the
predicted main effect of distractor frequency, F(1,57) = 15.65,
p < 0.001, ⌘2p = 0.215; distraction was attenuated in the high
compared to the low distractor frequency condition, consistent
with the predictions of the DMC framework. There was no main
effect of valence, F(1.68,95.95) = 0.663, p = 0.493, ⌘2p = 0.011.
However, the predicted interaction between distractor frequency
and the quadratic effect of valence approached significance,
F(1,57) = 3.909, p = 0.052, ⌘2p = 0.0642. Replicating previous
findings (Grimshaw et al., 2018), follow-up one-way ANOVAs
revealed a significant quadratic effect of valence in the low
distractor frequency condition, F(1,28) = 5.03, p = 0.033,
⌘2p = 0.152, with both positive and negative images producing
more distraction than neutral ones. However, there was no effect
of valence, nor was there a quadratic effect of valence in the
high distractor frequency condition, F(2,58) = 0.13, p = 0.880,
⌘2p = 0.004, and F(1,29) = 0.24, p = 0.631, ⌘2p = 0.01, respectively.
As expected, accuracy rates were very high overall (M = 96.8%,
SD = 3.9%), and their analysis produced no significant main
effects or interactions.
EEG Alpha Power
Figure 3 shows alpha power over the entire pre-stimulus time
period, for each condition. Time periods during which each
effect was significant for each ANOVA are marked on the figure;
a complete set of figures showing the F and FDR-corrected
p-values for all effects across the time window appears in
Supplementary Figure S1. There was an enduring main effect
of distractor frequency, showing that alpha power was tonically
suppressed in the high compared to low distractor frequency
condition, consistent with the engagement of proactive control.
This effect was significant at each data point (F’s = 4.75–8.48,
p’s = 0.039–0.049), except during the 526- to 1,000-ms window,
where each data point fell just above conventional levels of
significance (F’s = 3.905–4.75, p’s  0.053). There were no
significant effects or interactions involving valence for any
time period.
2Because overall response times were slower (non-significantly) in the
high-frequency condition (see Table 1), we repeated this analysis using a
proportional measure of distraction [(RT distractor present   RT distractor
absent)/(RT distractor absent)]. This normalization did not change any of the
reported effects (see Supplementary Material 1.4).
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TABLE 1 | Mean (SD) response times and distractor indices (in ms) in each experimental condition.
Condition Distractor present Distractor absent Distraction index t dz p
Low frequency
Positive 529 (71) 509 (58) 20 (30) 3.7⇤⇤ 0.70 <0.001
Neutral 526 (68) 516 (63) 10 (19) 3.0⇤ 0.53 0.003
Negative 539 (89) 522 (77) 17 (34) 2.7⇤ 0.50 0.006
High frequency
Positive 525 (82) 526 (78)  1 (18) 0.28 0.06 0.391
Neutral 532 (80) 531 (78) 1 (19) 3.0 0.05 0.442
Negative 527 (81) 529 (81)  2 (16) 0.50 0.13 0.309
Note: t, dz, and p-values refer to the comparison of distractor present and distractor absent trials in each condition. dz are effect sizes for within-subject comparisons (Lakens, 2013).
⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | Mean distraction indices (RT on distractor-present trials   RT
on distractor-absent trials) by distractor frequency and valence. Emotional
distraction was observed in the low distractor frequency condition but not the
high distractor frequency condition. Error bars are SEMs corrected for
within-subjects comparisons (Morey, 2008).
Consistent with the mass univariate ANOVA results, the
ANOVA using just the two time windows (pre-fixation and
pre-stimulus) on alpha power also revealed a main effect of
distractor frequency, F(1,57) = 5.22, p< 0.026, ⌘2p = 0.084, showing
that alpha was tonically suppressed in the high compared
to the low distractor frequency condition. In addition, there
was a predicted main effect of window, F(1,57) = 102.23,
p < 0.001, ⌘2p = 0.642, showing that alpha power dropped
following fixation cross onset, reflecting preparation to attend
to the target. However, there was no time window ⇥ distractor
frequency interaction, F(1,57) = 0.263, p = 0.610, ⌘2p = 0.005,
suggesting that the phasic changes in alpha (i.e., suppression
in response to fixation onset) did not differ between the high
and low distractor frequency conditions. Although a significant
valence ⇥ frequency interaction, F(2,110) = 4.45, p = 0.014,
⌘2p = 0.072, was present, post hoc paired t-tests found no
significant differences between distractor valences in either
condition, t’s =  2.47–2.79, p’s > 0.066–0.780, suggesting that
any differences in alpha suppression according to valence are
minimal. Visual inspection of Figure 3 supports this conclusion.
Taken together, our findings indicate that alpha in the
high-frequency condition was tonically suppressed across trials
(i.e., even before fixation cross onset), but that the phasic drop
in alpha following fixation (and in preparation for the upcoming
trial) was not sensitive to distractor frequency. In both frequency
conditions, there was no notable adjustment of either tonic
or phasic alpha suppression according to the expected valence
of a distractor.
To test for alpha lateralization, one-sample t-tests were
conducted on the mean ALI in the pre-stimulus (700–900 ms)
period for each valence per condition, using a Bonferroni-
corrected alpha level of 0.008. This analysis found no
evidence of lateralization in any condition (t’s =  1.927–1.509,
p’s = 0.060–0.613). This finding suggests that proactive
suppression of potential distractor locations cannot account for
the effective control of distraction observed in the high distractor
frequency condition (at least not as implemented by alpha
lateralization). Not surprisingly, the mass univariate analysis
of ALIs revealed no significant main effects or interactions
(F’s  1.857, p’s   0.130; see Figure 4), showing that alpha
lateralization did not systematically differ between conditions.
Dynamic changes in post-stimulus alpha are shown in
Figure 5; a complete set of figures showing the F and
FDR-corrected p values for all effects across the time window
appears in Supplementary Figure S2. A main effect of distractor
presence showed, as expected, greater suppression following
stimulus onset when distractors were present vs. absent; this
effect was significant from 288 to 1,588 ms post-stimulus,
F’s = 4.102–188.134, p’s = 0.001–0.050. Importantly, this
effect interacted with distractor frequency, F’s = 4.01–9.12,
p’s = < 0.001–0.050, showing that distractor-driven alpha
suppression (i.e., the greater suppression that occurs following
the appearance of distractors) was more pronounced in the
low compared to high distractor frequency condition. Further
analysis of this distractor-driven alpha suppression revealed a
main effect of valence from 512 to 990 ms, F’s = 4.64–6.39,
p’s = 0.021–0.050, which did not interact with distractor
frequency, F’s = 0.169–2.280, p’s  0.983. To clarify the effect
of valence, a further ANOVA was conducted on the mean
suppression indices within this window. A significant quadratic
effect of valence, F(1,57) = 10.154, p = 0.002, ⌘2p = 0.151, showed
greater distractor-driven alpha suppression following emotional
than neutral distractors.
DISCUSSION
Replicating previous findings (Grimshaw et al., 2018; Micucci
et al., 2020), emotional images were more distracting than
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FIGURE 3 | Log alpha power. (A) Grand average waveforms of
log-transformed individual alpha frequency (IAF) alpha power from pooled
electrodes 01, 02, and 0Z in the low (dashed lines) and high (solid lines)
distractor frequency conditions, according to valence block. Fixation onset
occurs at 0 ms. The gray box indicates the period when a stimulus display
could occur (900–1,100 ms). The gray horizontal line indicates where alpha
power was significantly reduced in the high compared to low distractor
frequency condition. Shaded error bars depict the ±95% within-subjects
confidence intervals. (B) Average alpha power during the pre-fixation
( 200 to 0 ms) and pre-stimulus (700–900 ms) time windows. Error bars
depict the between-subjects SEM.
neutral ones when distractors were rare, but not when they
were frequent. A parsimonious explanation of these findings
is that greater proactive control is engaged when distractors
are expected to appear more frequently, which enables effective
control of emotional distractors. Our aim here was to test
this account directly by measuring alpha suppression as an
online index of cognitive control. In discussing these findings,
we return to our four questions. First, does high distractor
frequency promote the use of either sustained or dynamic
proactive control? Second, is such control tailored to the expected
valence of a distractor? Third, is proactive control achieved
through location-based distractor inhibition? Finally, how does
high distractor frequency affect the subsequent neural response
to distractors?
Does High Distractor Frequency Promote
the Use of Proactive Control?
In answer to the first question, alpha was tonically suppressed
in the high compared to low distractor frequency condition,
indicating greater baseline attentional engagement when
FIGURE 4 | Alpha lateralization indices. Alpha lateralization indices for the
low and high distractor frequency conditions, as a function of valence block.
A negative value indicates greater alpha power over the side contralateral to
the potential distractor location (indicating suppression at potential distraction
locations), with a value of zero signifying the absence of lateralized
differences. The gray box indicates the time window of possible stimulus
onset. No significant alpha lateralization was found.
distractors were expected to appear often, consistent with the
use of sustained (i.e., block-wide) proactive control. Because
proactive control requires continuous goal maintenance, the
sustained increase in attentional engagement under high
distractor frequency is consistent with predictions from the
DMC (Braver, 2012). Indeed, in other paradigms, neural indices
of attentional engagement have shown similarly sustained
differences between proactive and reactive control conditions
(Chiew and Braver, 2013; Marini et al., 2016), and proactive
control can be mediated by sustained activation in the lPFC
(Jimura et al., 2010; Lesh et al., 2013). A sustained proactive
strategy in the high distractor frequency condition is also
consistent with findings from the list-wise manipulations of
trial proportion in other paradigms (e.g., Stroop, flanker),
which have been found to promote proactive control that is
sustained across trials in anticipation of upcoming conflict
(Bugg and Crump, 2012).
We also observed an expected phasic suppression of alpha
following fixation onset, but the degree of suppression did not
differ according to either valence or distractor frequency. The
similar pattern of phasic alpha suppression across conditions
suggests that, on a trial-by-trial basis, participants prepared
similarly to attend to the target regardless of their expectations
about upcoming distractors. This lack of difference in phasic
alpha suppression between conditions further supports the
conclusion that the effective control of distraction in the high
distractor frequency condition is achieved through a sustained,
rather than dynamic, proactive strategy.
The DMC framework suggests that sustained proactive
control is implemented through the alteration of attentional
control settings to optimize task-relevant processing, and our
data are consistent with this hypothesis. However, we must
acknowledge an alternative mechanism, that the apparent
block-wide alpha suppression in the high compared to low
distractor frequency condition instead reflects an accumulation
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FIGURE 5 | Post-stimulus alpha power. (A) Grand average waveforms of
post-stimulus alpha power in the low and high distractor frequency
conditions, following either a distractor (dashed lines) or no-distractor (solid
lines), appearing at 0 ms, by valence block. Stimulus onset occurs at 0 ms.
(B) Distractor driven alpha suppression (calculated as Distractor
Present   Distractor Absent alpha power) in the low (dashed lines) and high
(solid lines) distractor frequency conditions. The black line indicates where
distractor-driven alpha suppression was greater in the low compared to the
high distractor frequency condition. The red line indicates where there was a
main effect of valence: alpha was more suppressed following emotional
compared to non-emotional distractors during this period. Shaded error bars
depict the ±95% within-subjects confidence intervals.
of sequential effects. Alpha suppression following presentation
of a distractor may carry over into the next trial, and this
carryover would occur more frequently in the high distractor
frequency condition. Note that this is an alternative mechanism
of proactive control, reflecting a transient up-regulation of
control following conflict (i.e., conflict adaptation; Botvinick
et al., 2001). Unfortunately, the current study was not
designed to distinguish between global anticipatory control
and such cumulative sequential effects, a widespread limitation
in paradigms manipulating conflict proportions. In order to
clearly disentangle global anticipatory from sequential effects,
future studies will need to ensure sufficient trials in each
condition to reliably compare trials that follow distractor-present
vs. distractor-absent trials. Additional EEG indices of control
may also be useful in further exploring potential mechanisms.
Although we confined our analysis here to posterior alpha as a
well-established index of control, other measures (e.g., frontal
alpha, midfrontal theta) may provide additional insights into
the broader network that implements control. Regardless of
the specific mechanisms by which posterior alpha suppression
facilitates performance, our findings provide clear evidence that
increased distractor frequency promotes proactive control.
Is Proactive Control Tailored to the
Potential Potency of an Expected
Distractor?
Because proactive control is often associated with some sort
of cognitive ‘‘effort,’’ we wondered whether participants would
engage greater control (or at least greater pre-stimulus alpha
suppression) when they expected distractors to be emotional.
Given that emotional distractors are more disruptive in the
low-frequency condition, we might expect greater proactive
alpha suppression to be required to achieve their effective
control in the high-frequency condition. If so, we should
have seen greater pre-stimulus alpha suppression in emotional
than in neutral blocks and particularly in the high distractor
frequency condition. However, expected emotional (compared to
neutral) distractors did not increase either tonic or phasic alpha
suppression. This means that the same level of alpha suppression
was sufficient to guard against both emotional and neutral
distractors in the high-frequency condition. We speculate that
the control of emotional distraction may depend on a threshold
level of alpha suppression. Alpha power above threshold may
allow distractors to capture attention, requiring reactive control
mechanisms that are less effective against emotional than neutral
distractors. However, alpha power sustained below threshold
may effectively guard against all distractors regardless of valence.
In other words, the emotionality of a distractor becomes relevant
after it has captured attention, but not before.
Is Proactive Control Implemented via
Suppression of Potential Distractor
Locations?
Proactive control describes a collection of possible mechanisms
that can act prior to conflict to reduce its impact. One
possible mechanism by which proactive control might be
implemented in our task is through anticipatory inhibition
of processing in areas of the visual field where distractors
frequently appear (Wang and Theeuwes, 2018a,b). We therefore
blocked the visual field in which a distractor could appear
so that we could examine lateralized alpha suppression, a
measure that has been proposed as an index of spatial inhibition
of visual processing (Foxe and Snyder, 2011). We found no
systematic alpha lateralization in any condition, and therefore
no evidence that anticipatory spatial inhibition served as a
mechanism of proactive control. On the face of it, this finding
suggests that proactive control might be implemented through
the enhancement of visual processing related to the target
(either its location or features), and not suppression related to
distractors. However, recent evidence cautions that location-
based distractor inhibition can occur in the absence of alpha
lateralization (e.g., Noonan et al., 2016), and the validity of alpha
lateralization as an index of spatial inhibition has recently been
challenged (Foster and Awh, 2019). Therefore, our failure to
find alpha lateralization should not be taken as strong evidence
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of whether participants did (or did not) use location-based
inhibition as a mechanism of control. Future research that can
dissociate target enhancement from distractor suppression (for
example, using the N2pc and Pd components in ERP studies;
Hickey et al., 2009; Hilimire et al., 2012) will be important in
elucidating the specific mechanisms by which proactive control
is implemented.
How Does High Distractor Frequency
Affect the Neural Response to Distractors?
In both distractor frequency conditions, post-stimulus alpha
suppression was greater following distractors (relative to when
targets were presented alone) and was more pronounced when
the distractors were emotional. This pattern of findings is in line
with previous reports that alpha suppression is greater following
high compared to low conflict stimuli (Itthipuripat et al., 2017;
Jiang et al., 2018a). Importantly, there was less distractor-driven
suppression in the high compared to the low distractor frequency
condition, suggesting that distractors produced less conflict when
they were expected to appear frequently. Although proactive and
reactive control are commonly taken to be independent (Braver,
2012; Mäki-Marttunen et al., 2019) and implemented through
different neural systems (Braver et al., 2007; Geng, 2014; Schmid
et al., 2015), they may still exhibit a reciprocal relationship, in
that greater proactive control reduces the need for subsequent
reactive control.
CONCLUSION
Emotional stimuli are, of course, everywhere. Although they
often provide important survival information, they can also
be entirely irrelevant to our current goals. Our findings here
replicate previous research showing that our sensitivity to
emotional distractors depends on our current mode of cognitive
control: when conditions favor reactive control, task-irrelevant
emotional images disrupt performance, but when conditions
favor proactive control, neither emotional nor non-emotional
images are distracting. Such flexible use of cognitive control
allows for an optimal response to emotional distractors. When
they are rare, they may signal important survival information
and so it is adaptive for them to interrupt ongoing processing.
However, when they appear frequently without consequence,
they are no longer informative, and effective goal-directed
behavior is best served if they are ignored. Here, we provide
evidence that top-down modulation of posterior alpha power
may be one mechanism by which these dual modes of emotional
control can be implemented.
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